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The doctrine of stare decisis stands as a defining characteristic 
of the U.S. common law system.  When a court decides a principle 
of law, the public can confidently presume future cases in front of 
that court will follow the same principle, thus ensuring stability 
and continuity in the law.  “Stare decisis in essence ‘makes each 
judgment a statement of the law, or precedent, binding in future 
cases before the same court or another court owing obedience to its 
decision.’”1  But at agencies like the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”), the doctrine does not 
apply.2  In February 2013, for example, one patent owner failed to 
satisfy the domestic industry requirement for two of its asserted 
patents because the Commission changed its practice of allowing a 
domestic industry based on an invalid claim.3 
Like other federal agencies, the ITC can freely depart from its 
own prior precedent as it deems necessary.  In doing so, it must 
simply provide a rational explanation for its decision.  Failure to 
provide sufficient rationale for a change from prior practice can 
cause an appeals court to vacate and remand an agency’s decision 
to require further explanation.4  Waiting for the appeals court to 
                                                                                                             
1 Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (internal 
citations omitted). 
2 See Certain NAND Flash Memory Circuits & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 
337-TA-526, USITC Pub. No. 3970, 2007 WL 4861334, at *7 (Dec. 2007). 
3 See Certain Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 
337-TA-739, Comm’n Op., 2012 WL 2394435 (June 2012). 
4 See Ramaprakash v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 346 F.3d 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(“Agencies are free to change course as their expertise and experience may suggest or 
require, but when they do so they must provide a ‘reasoned analysis indicating that prior 
policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.’” (quoting 
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overturn an ITC decision, however, can be devastating to a 
business suffering a loss due to an ITC exclusion order blocking it 
from importing products into the United States.5 
This Article explores the legal framework that allows federal 
agencies like the ITC to set aside their own precedent, explains 
how the appeals court examines such agency decisions, and details 
recent ITC decisions where the Commission set aside its own 
precedent. 
                                                                                                             
Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); 
see also NSK Ltd. v. United States, 390 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“If [the 
Department of] Commerce wants to treat these expenses inconsistently, then under 
Chevron we still must defer, but only if [it] reasonably explains the inconsistency and 
does not act arbitrarily.”). 
5 Regardless of whether a party appeals, exclusion orders go into effect sixty days 
after the ITC’s decision.  In only six instances has the President blocked implementation 
of an ITC exclusion order during the sixty-day Presidential review period. See Letter 
from Ambassador Michael B. G. Froman to Chairman Irving A. Williamson (Aug. 3, 
1013) (disapproving of the limited exclusion order in Certain Electronic Devices, 
Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing 
Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794); Presidential Disapproval of a 
Section 337 Determination, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,011-02 (Dec. 3, 1987) (disapproving limited 
exclusion order in Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAMs), Inv. No. 337-
TA-242); Determination of the President Regarding Certain Alkaline Batteries, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 1,655-01 (Jan. 11, 1985) (disapproving the ITC’s exclusion order in Certain 
Alkaline Batteries, Inv. No. 337-TA-165); Presidential Disapproval of the Determination 
of the U.S. International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-99, Certain 
Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, 47 Fed. Reg. 
29,919-02 (July 9, 1982) (disapproving the ITC’s order in Certain Molded-In Sandwich 
Panel Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, Inv. No. 337-TA-99); 46 Fed. Reg. 
32,361-01 (June 22, 1981) (disapproving exclusion order in Certain Headboxes and 
Papermaking Machine Forming Sections for the Continuous Production of Paper, and 
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-82); Presidential Determination of April 22, 
1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (Apr. 22, 1978) (disapproving exclusion order in Certain 
Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29).  In addition, stays of an ITC 
exclusion order during an appeal are rarely granted. See, e.g., Winbond Electr. Corp. v. 
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 262 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In December 2000, 
Winbond, Sanyo and SST filed motions for stays, pending appeal, of the limited 
exclusion order issued by the Commission.  This court denied the motions for stays and 
instead ordered an expedited review due to the impending expiration of the ′903 patent.”). 
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 
Congress created the ITC as a government agency to 
investigate unfair trade practices.  Last amended in 1988, 19 
U.S.C. § 1337, which traces its roots to section 337 of the Tariff 
Act of 1922, empowers the Commission to investigate unfair trade 
practices, including the importation, sale for importation, and/or 
sale after importation of products infringing a U.S. patent, 
copyright, or trademark.6  Section 337 investigations are not 
limited to these things, however, and can also cover other unfair 
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of 
products, such as misappropriation of trade secrets and false 
advertising. 
Section 337 investigations begin when the ITC receives a 
formal complaint alleging a violation of the statute.  For the ITC to 
find a violation of section 337, it must conclude that four separate 
statutory elements exist: (1) importation, (2) an infringing product 
or some other form of unfair competition, (3) a domestic industry 
of the complaining party (called the “complainant” at the ITC), and 
(4) in unfair competition investigations under § 337(a)(1)(A), that 
the sale of products made through unfair competition harm or 
threaten to harm an industry in the United States.7 
Because the ITC is a government agency and not an Article III 
court, such as a U.S. district court, the Administrative Procedures 
Act (“APA”) (starting at 5 U.S.C. § 500) provides the procedural 
backbone for section 337 investigations.  The APA provides for 
basic due process, and at the ITC, that means notice of the claims, 
an opportunity to submit evidence and argument, a hearing on the 
record before an administrative law judge, and a written decision.8 
Cases at the ITC are tried before an administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”) in a fashion similar to a bench trial in district court.  But 
in contrast to district courts, the judge at the ITC issues his or her 
decision as an Initial Determination.9  After doing so, it may then 
                                                                                                             
6 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2012). 
7 See id. 
8 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57 (2012). 
9 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(a)(1)(i) (2013). 
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be reviewed by the Commissioners.  Six Commissioners, 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, 
make all final decisions at the Commission.10  The Commissioners 
serve overlapping terms of nine years each and no more than three 
Commissioners may be of any one political party.11  When a party 
petitions the Commission for review of an ALJ’s Initial 
Determination, the Commissioners vote whether they will do so, 
with only one vote in the affirmative needed to trigger review.12  
According to the rules, the Commission will review an Initial 
Determination for (1) findings or conclusions of material fact that 
are clearly erroneous; (2) legal conclusions that are erroneous, 
without governing precedent or law, or constitute an abuse of 
discretion; or (3) issues affecting Commission policy.13  The 
Commission may choose to review only portions of a decision, and 
it may ask for further briefing from the parties on specific 
questions related to the issues it reviews.14  The Commission’s 
decision may then be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.15 
Compared to district courts—which may award monetary 
damages—the sole remedy at the ITC is an exclusion order, which 
acts as a permanent injunction to block infringing imports from 
entering the country.16  The issuance of exclusion orders is 
governed by statute, meaning that the ITC does not consider the 
traditional factors of equity when awarding relief like a district 
court.17  As a result, a patentee might not qualify for a permanent 
                                                                                                             
10 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(h); § 210.45(c). 
11 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a)–(b). 
12 See 19 C.F.R. § 210.45(a). 
13 See id. § 210.43(b)(1). 
14 See id. § 210.43(d)(1). 
15 See id. § 210.43(b)(3); see, e.g., MEMS Tech. Berhad. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 447 
Fed. App’x 142 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (appeal from decision of USITC to Federal Circuit). 
16 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (Exclusion of Articles from Entry); Spansion v. U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1358–60 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the ITC does not need 
to apply the four-factor test from eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006), before issuing an exclusion order). 
17 Int’l Trade Comm’n and Patent Disputes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the Comm. on Judiciary House of 
Representatives, 112th Cong 112-43 (2012). 
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injunction in a district court, but the ITC imposes that form of 
relief if it finds a violation of section 337. 
Another unique aspect of the ITC is its statutory consideration 
of the public interest.  The ITC staff attorneys represent the public 
interest and will participate at trial like a party to the litigation.18  
Further, the Commission sometimes directs the administrative law 
judge to collect evidence on the public interest, and the 
Commission must consider the effects of an exclusion order on the 
public interest before issuing one.19  In certain instances, although 
rare, the Commission will not issue an exclusion order to stop 
infringing activity because of its detrimental effects on the public 
interest.20  For example, in one instance where an exclusion order 
would have blocked the importation of specialized hospital beds 
for burn patients at a time when there were no alternative sources 
of supply to fulfill the demand, the Commission denied its 
issuance.21  At other times, the Commission has tailored or delayed 
exclusion orders based on the public interest.22 
In addition to these unique aspects, the ITC also distinguishes 
itself from district courts in the way it treats prior Commission 
                                                                                                             
18 Section 337 Investigations, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, USITC Pub. 
No. 4105, at 23 (Mar. 2009) (“The Commission also assigns an investigative attorney 
from the Commission’s Office of Unfair Import Investigations (“OUII”), who functions 
as an independent litigant representing the public interest in the investigation.”). 
19 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (Before issuing an exclusion order, the ITC must consider 
“the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the 
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States 
consumers.”); 19 C.F.R. § 210.10(b) (“The Commission may order the administrative law 
judge to take evidence and to issue a recommended determination on the public interest 
based generally on the submissions of the parties and the public under § 210.8(b) and 
(c).”). 
20 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1); Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, USITC Pub. 1022, 
Inv. No. 337-TA-60, Comm’n Op. at 6 (1974) (finding the public interest weighed 
against issuing an exclusion order); Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus & 
Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1667, Inv. Nos. 337-TA-182/188, Comm’n Op. at 25 
(Oct. 1984) (same) (“Fluidized Supporting Apparatus”); Certain Inclined-Field 
Acceleration Tubes & Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1119, Inv. No. 337-TA-67 
Comm’n Op. at 24 (Dec. 1980) (same). 
21 See Fluidized Supporting Apparatus Comm’n Op. at 23–25; see also Spansion, 629 
F.3d at 1360 (citing cases where exclusion order denied because of the public interest). 
22 See, e.g., Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related 
Software, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,402 (Dec. 23, 2011) (notice). 
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precedent.  As explained below, while stare decisis serves as a 
defining feature of U.S. district courts, it takes quite a different role 
at the ITC. 
II. STARE DECISIS AND ITS ROLE IN DISTRICT COURTS AND THE ITC 
A. The Principle Underlying Stare Decisis 
The doctrine of stare decisis is a pillar supporting the common 
law legal system.  Under the doctrine, a settled decision of law 
binds subsequent courts, requiring that similar cases be decided 
similarly.  The doctrine rests on a policy judgment that “in most 
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right.”23  When a legal principle 
becomes accepted and established, the public expects it will not 
readily change.  Such stability and continuity in the law provides a 
clear guide for conduct, ensures predictable and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on and confidence 
in the judicial system, and contributes to the integrity of the 
judicial process.24 
Under stare decisis, the decisions of appellate courts bind the 
lower courts in their purview.  As for the federal appellate courts, 
the “law of the circuit rule” generally demands that panel decisions 
by a circuit court are binding on subsequent panels.25  The “‘law of 
the circuit’ rule (a branch of the stare decisis doctrine) holds that, 
                                                                                                             
23 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & 
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
24 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (“[The stare decisis] doctrine 
permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in 
the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our 
constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.”); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 
194 (2013) (“The rule of stare decisis is founded largely on considerations of judicial 
efficiency and sound principles of public policy, to preserve the continuity, predictability 
and stability of the law, and to protect judicially declared principles affecting property 
rights.” (internal citations omitted)); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 129 (2013) (“Stare decisis 
is the preferred course because it promotes evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to 
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” (internal citations omitted)). 
25 See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 
2006). 
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‘[o]rdinarily, newly constituted panels in a multi-panel circuit 
should consider themselves bound by prior panel decisions’ closely 
on point.”26  Indeed, at the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, a panel decision is binding precedent on all future panels 
unless the court sits en banc and overrules the earlier panel 
decision.27  The United States Supreme Court, which has no further 
appellate oversight, rarely departs from prior precedent and only in 
the most unusual of circumstances.28  As the Court has previously 
explained, “the rule of law demands that adhering to our prior case 
law be the norm,” and “departure from precedent is exceptional, 
and requires ‘special justification.’”29  Those circumstances 
include when the law has become unworkable or was badly 
reasoned.30 
Although the principle of stare decisis stands as a bedrock 
principle of the federal and state courts in the U.S. common law 
system, federal agencies follow a different standard. 
B. Stare Decisis Does Not Apply in Agency Actions 
Under the APA, agencies make policy through either 
rulemaking or adjudication.  The adjudicative process in federal 
agencies often resembles litigation before district courts, but 
agencies follow a different set of rules.  Consistency garners value 
during agency adjudication, and, as a general rule, an agency must 
arrive at the same conclusion when presented with similar cases.  
Indeed, “[a] fundamental norm of administrative procedure 
requires an agency to treat like cases alike.”31  It follows that an 
agency must justify its rationale for reaching different conclusions 
when presented with similar cases.  Said another way, “[i]f the 
                                                                                                             
26 Id. (quoting Eulitt v. Me. Dept. of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
27 See Preminger v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“A prior precedential decision on a point of law by a panel of this court is binding 
precedent and cannot be overruled or avoided unless or until the court sits en banc.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
28 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
29 Id. 
30 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996). 
31 Westar Energy, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 473 F.3d 1239, 1241 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007). 
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agency makes an exception in one case, then it must either make 
an exception in a similar case or point to a relevant distinction 
between the two cases.”32  But stare decisis does not apply in 
federal agencies the way it does in federal court, and “[a]n 
agency . . . is not bound by the shackles of stare decisis to follow 
blindly the interpretations that it, or the courts of appeals, have 
adopted in the past.”33 
For example, although an agency like the ITC is bound by 
precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the 
ITC is not bound by its own decisions.34  Further, decisions of one 
administrative law judge are not binding on another if the 
Commission did not review the decision.35  Instead, like other 
agencies, the ITC may change course as its expertise and 
experience may suggest or require.  Indeed, it is often hoped that 
agency decisions will continually evolve as they are informed by 
new experiences and increased expertise.36 
At the same time, under principles similar to stare decisis, 
agencies are encouraged to follow precedent.  Unlike stare decisis, 
however, agencies are free to change course if they simply explain 
why.37  More specifically, if an agency departs from precedent, it 
                                                                                                             
32 Id. at 1241 (citation omitted). 
33 Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Jupiter Energy 
Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 482 F.3d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 2007) (“To 
receive judicial deference, an agency’s interpretation of law must be consistent with 
previous agency determinations.  An agency must provide a ‘reasoned explanation for its 
departure from established case law.’” (citation omitted)); Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (“This is not to say that an agency, once it has announced a 
precedent, must forever hew to it.  Experience is often the best teacher, and agencies 
retain a substantial measure of freedom to refine, reformulate, and even reverse their 
precedents in the light of new insights and changed circumstances.  However, the law 
demands a certain orderliness.” (internal citations omitted)). 
34 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
35 See, e.g., Certain NAND Flash Memory Circuits and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. 
No. 337-TA-546, Comm’n Op., 2005 WL 3701389, at *6  (Oct. 19, 2005) (“Hence the 
administrative law judge rejects any argument by complainant that respondents are bound 
by any result in the [prior] Samsung investigation.”). 
36 See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, 2 ADMIN. L. & PRAC., § 5:67 (3d 
ed. 2011) (citing Davila-Bardales, 27 F.3d at 5). 
37 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (“[A]n agency changing its course . . . is obligated to supply 
a reasoned analysis for the change . . . .”); see also Schucker v. FDIC, 401 F.3d 1347, 
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must provide a “reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and 
standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.”38  
Departing from prior precedent without providing such a reasoned 
analysis constitutes unreasonable and unpredictable action.  As the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has explained, “review under 
the APA is highly deferential, but agency action is arbitrary and 
capricious if it departs from agency precedent without 
explanation.”39  Indeed, for this very reason, the Federal Circuit 
has remanded a number of decisions, including those by the 
Secretary of Commerce,40 the Department of Commerce,41 the 
Merit Systems Protection Board,42 and the Department of Veterans 
Affairs.43 
C. The Federal Circuit Requires Agencies to Provide a Rationale 
for Departing from Prior Agency Decisions 
The Federal Circuit hears appeals from a number of federal 
agencies and a majority of its caseload—55%—consists of 
administrative law cases.44  Its jurisdiction includes appeals from 
the U.S. Court of International Trade, the ITC, the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection 
Board, the Boards of Contract Appeals, and the Trademark Trial 
                                                                                                             
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The court will act if an agency, without explanation, engages in 
conduct that is inconsistent with its precedent.”). 
38 Ramaprakash v. Fed. Aviation Ass’n, 346 F.3d 1121, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 444 F.2d 841, 852 
(D.C. Cir. 1970)). 
39 Id. at 1124. 
40 See M.M. & P. Mar. Advancement, Training, Educ. & Safety Program v. Dep’t of 
Commerce, 729 F.2d 748, 754–55 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
41 See NSK Ltd. v. United States, 390 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004); SKF U.S.A. Inc. v. 
United States, 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
42 See Schucker v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 401 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
43 See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
44 See Court Jurisdiction, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited June 10, 
2014) (“The court’s jurisdiction consists of administrative law cases (55%), intellectual 
property cases (31%), and cases involving money damages against the United States 
government (11%).”). 
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and Appeals Board, among others.45  When these courts or 
agencies act contrary to their own precedent, the Federal Circuit 
often demands a reasoned explanation. 
For example, in one Federal Circuit decision, M.M. & P. 
Maritime Advancement, Training, Education & Safety Program 
(MATES) appealed the Secretary of Commerce’s denial of its 
application to import two simulators, duty free, under the 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials Importation Act of 
1966 (Importation Act).46  The Federal Circuit reversed and 
remanded, finding error with the Secretary’s narrow interpretation 
of the Importation Act.47 
On appeal the Secretary made two primary arguments to 
support its denial.  First, the Secretary argued that the Importation 
Act requires that the instrument “must have a scientific purpose,”48 
which did not include the vocational training as proposed by 
MATES.  Second, he argued that he had consistently interpreted 
the Importation Act to require that the imported article be used in 
scientific research or formal science-oriented education.49  In fact, 
the Secretary argued that if any of his past decisions erred and 
offered an inconsistent interpretation with the one offered here, he 
was not required to follow them, stating that “[i]f the Department 
erred in an earlier case, involving [the device at issue], which we 
do believe was the case, we are not obligated to perpetuate the 
error.”50 
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the decision.  First, 
it found the Importation Act did not require that the imported 
article be used for formal science-oriented education.  As the court 
explained, “[a]lthough we agree with the government that in order 
for the Secretary to make his scientific equivalency determination 
                                                                                                             
45 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit). 
46 M.M. & P. Mar. Advancement, Training, Educ. & Safety Program v. Dep’t of 
Commerce, 729 F.2d 748, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
47 See id. at 757. 
48 Id. at 752. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 754. 
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the article must have some ‘scientific value’ for its intended use, 
we, however, do not agree that this means that the article must be 
used in formal science-oriented education.”51  The court also found 
that the Importation Act allows the article to be used in vocational 
training, holding “that vocational training in a scientific field does 
come within the Act” and that “appellant’s use of the simulators 
was to educate and train students in such a scientific field.”52 
Contrary to the Secretary’s argument that he had consistently 
interpreted the Importation Act, the Federal Circuit found the 
Secretary’s interpretation that the article must be used in formal 
science-oriented education an ad-hoc rationale used only to reject 
MATES’s application.  As the court explained, the “Secretary, 
however, has not consistently interpreted the statute as requiring 
that the article must be used in formal science-oriented 
education . . . .  This is a new requirement arbitrarily imposed on 
MATES in this case.”53  The court found the Secretary offered no 
rationale that could justify such a failure of due process, 
pronouncing that “[a]n agency is obligated to follow precedent, 
and if it chooses to change, it must explain why.”54 
In another decision, NSK Ltd. v. United States, the Federal 
Circuit likewise found fault with an agency’s sudden change in 
position.  In this case pertaining to antidumping duty orders on 
bearings, NSK appealed to the Court of International Trade 
(“CIT”) the Department of Commerce’s determination that NSK’s 
repacking expenses were in fact selling expenses and Commerce’s 
denial of NSK’s requested partial level of trade adjustment.55  The 
CIT affirmed.56  The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the 
decision regarding NSK’s repackaging expenses and affirmed 
Commerce’s denial of NSK’s requested level of trade 
adjustment.57 
                                                                                                             
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 757. 
53 Id. at 754. 
54 Id. at 755. 
55 NSK Ltd. v. United States, 390 F.3d 1352, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1353. 
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Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
which set forth a test to determine whether to give deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers,58 the Federal 
Circuit stated it should defer to the Department of Commerce’s 
interpretation provided that the department adequately explained 
why it treated the expenses differently.  As the court explained, 
“[i]f Commerce wants to treat these expenses inconsistently, then 
under Chevron we still must defer, but only if Commerce 
reasonably explains the inconsistency and does not act 
arbitrarily.”59  The Federal Circuit found the Department of 
Commerce’s classification of NSK’s expenses inconsistent, and 
vacated and remanded this issue, holding that “[e]xpenses incurred 
for U.S. repacking, U.S. warehousing, and U.S. shipping (from the 
warehouse to particular customers) are analogous.  To be 
consistent, it would appear that Commerce should classify them as 
the same type of expenses, whether that be as movement expenses 
or as sales expenses.”60 
In an appeal related to veterans’ law, the Federal Circuit found 
fault with the agency’s conflicting interpretations of identical 
language from two regulations related to awards of dependency 
and indemnity compensation (“DIC”).61  In this appeal, the 
National Organization of Veterans Advocates, Inc. (“NOVA”), and 
two other veterans groups, petitioned the Federal Circuit to review 
38 C.F.R. § 3.22 (effective Jan. 21, 2000), promulgated by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”).62  The Federal Circuit 
remanded this case to DVA to reconcile this regulation with 38 
                                                                                                             
58 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
59 NSK, 390 F.3d at 1358. 
60 Id. at 1357–58. 
61 Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
62 Id. at 1372; see also Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 688 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“[U]nder 38 U.S.C. § 502, we may review the [DVA] procedural and substantive 
rules, any amendments to those rules, and the process in which those rules are made or 
amended.”). 
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C.F.R. § 20.1106, where the DVA reached a different conclusion 
when interpreting the same language.63 
In Veterans’ Advocates, the Federal Circuit found the DVA at 
fault for not providing an explanation for the two different 
interpretations of the phrase “entitled to receive,” noting that “the 
revised regulation challenged here [38 C.F.R. § 3.22] appears to be 
inconsistent with 38 C.F.R. § 20.1106, though those regulations 
purport to interpret virtually identical language contained in related 
veterans’ benefits statutes.”64  Thus, the court remanded the case to 
DVA to provide such an explanation.  As the court held, “to 
overcome this presumption that Congress intended the phrase 
‘entitled to receive’ to have the same meaning in sections 1311 and 
1318, the agency must explain the rationale for the different 
interpretations.  And that explanation must be a reasonable one.”65 
In Schucker v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the 
Federal Circuit found an agency’s decision inconsistent with its 
past practice and remanded the issue for an explanation of the 
inconsistency.66  Schucker sought relief from the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (“Board”) after the FDIC fired her through a 
reduction in force and denied her right to take a lower position.67  
The Board affirmed and Schucker appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.68  The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.69 
The Federal Circuit found the Board consistently allowed 
parties to present rebuttal evidence, noting that “[t]he longstanding 
policy of the Board to allow parties an opportunity to submit 
rebuttal evidence appears in a number of Board decisions . . . .”70  
Yet in Schucker’s case, the Board did not review the rebuttal 
                                                                                                             
63 Veterans’ Advocates, 260 F.3d at 1368. 
64 Id. at 1379. 
65 Id. at 1379–80 (internal citations omitted). 
66 Schucker v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 401 F.3d 1347, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
67 Id. at 1349. 
68 Id. at 1352. 
69 Id. at 1358. 
70 Id. at 1355. 
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evidence she submitted.71  The Federal Circuit found this 
inconsistent treatment required its intervention because “the court 
will act if an agency, without explanation, engages in conduct that 
is inconsistent with its precedent.”72  The court remanded the case 
because the Board failed to provide a rationale for deviating from 
its prior practice of allowing rebuttal evidence.  As the court 
explained: 
Because the Board excluded Schucker’s rebuttal 
evidence and failed to offer a reasonable 
explanation for either changing or not following its 
longstanding practice of affording parties an 
opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence, we 
conclude that the Board acted arbitrarily.  We 
vacate the Board’s decision and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.73 
The Federal Circuit has similarly found the ITC improperly 
departed from its own precedent.  In Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n (“Amgen I”), the Federal Circuit reversed the ITC’s 
decision in Inv. No. 337-TA-568 due to, among other reasons, the 
ITC’s failure to follow its own precedent.74  In Inv. 568, the ALJ 
found the safe harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) prevented 
the ITC from having jurisdiction over the imported products at 
issue.75  Section 271(e)(1) authorizes the importation of drugs used 
                                                                                                             
71 Id. at 1352 (“In determining whether the Agency met its burden, the Administrative 
Judge did not consider the purported rebuttal evidence . . . .”). 
72 Id. at 1356 (“By taking a position inconsistent with this longstanding practice, 
without any explanation for the shift, the Board’s action is not reasoned decision-making 
and is arbitrary.”). 
73 Id. at 1358. 
74 Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 519 F.3d 1343, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Amgen I”) (reversing ITC decision that it lacked jurisdiction in part because the ITC’s 
own precedent weighed in favor of jurisdiction under the facts of the case), reh’g en banc 
granted, Amgen Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 565 F.3d 846, 853–54 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“Amgen II”) (withdrawing section of opinion discussing jurisdiction because it was 
unnecessary to reach that decision based on the facts of the case). 
75 See Certain Prods. & Pharm. Compositions Containing Recombinant Human 
Erythropoietin, Inv. No. 337-TA-568, Notice of Commission Decision Not to Review an 
Initial Determination Granting Respondents’ Motion for Summary Determination That 
There is No Violation of Section 337, 71 Fed. Reg. 52579 (Sept. 6, 2006). 
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for development and submission to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration.  The ITC determined not to review the ALJ’s 
decision making it the final decision of the Commission.76 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found the ALJ erred when he 
concluded that the “Commission does not have jurisdiction to 
investigate and remedy infringement with respect to importation 
that is subject to the safe harbor, unless there is also actual sale in 
the United States or contract for sale of the imported product.”77  
Citing ITC precedent, the Federal Circuit pointed out that the ITC 
had previously found jurisdiction when it determined there was the 
threat of an imminent importation of a product alleged to infringe a 
patent.78  Thus, the Federal Circuit found that the new requirement 
of an actual sale imposed by the ALJ, and adopted by the ITC, 
contradicted ITC precedent and reversed.79 
The panel withdrew this opinion and issued a new opinion after 
the Federal Circuit received a petition for rehearing en banc.80  In 
this second opinion, the panel withdrew its earlier opinion on 
jurisdiction and concluded they did not have to determine whether 
the ITC’s jurisdiction included “imminent importations.”  Instead, 
the panel concluded the ITC had jurisdiction because no party 
disputed that Roche had imported the accused product into the 
United States.81  The Amgen I opinion, although withdrawn, 
illustrates how the Federal Circuit can respond when the ITC fails 
to follow its own precedent. 
                                                                                                             
76 Id. 
77 Amgen I, 519 F.3d at 1350.  
78 Id. at 1350–51 (“In view of the remedial purpose of Section 337, and the prospective 
nature of any remedy that may be afforded, the imminent importation by a party 
respondent in an ongoing investigation of a new product which is alleged to infringe 
complainant’s patent and to have the tendency to injure the domestic industry, clearly 
falls within the Commission’s jurisdiction.” (citing Certain Low–Nitrosamine Trifluralin 
Herbicides, Inv. No. 337-TA-245, 1986 ITC LEXIS 91, at *4 (Sept. 14, 1986))). 
79 Id. at 1352. 
80 Amgen II, 565 F.3d at 848 n.1. 
81 Id. at 853–54. 
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D. Instances Where the Commission Departed from Its Own 
Precedent 
The popularity of the ITC as a forum for litigating intellectual 
property disputes has rapidly increased over the past decade.  One 
primary reason for its popularity is the speed of adjudication.82  
The statute requires the ITC to conduct investigations “at the 
earliest practicable time.”83  Historically, the Commission has 
strived to complete investigations in less than fifteen months.84  A 
second reason for the popularity of the ITC is the strong remedy it 
grants.  Instead of monetary relief, the Commission grants 
exclusion orders to ban further imports into the United States.85  In 
some instances, this can completely block a company’s competitor 
from the U.S. market.86 
But one aspect of the ITC for which some practitioners may 
not be aware is the Commission’s authority to depart from 
precedent at the final stage of an investigation.  The parties may 
proceed through trial and obtain a decision from the administrative 
law judge based on existing precedent, but the Commission has the 
                                                                                                             
82 See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist?  An Empirical Analysis of Patent 
Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 63 (2008); 
Neil Edward L. Santos, III et al., What IP Holders Ought to Know About the ITC and the 
District Courts, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 173, 173 (2007) (“[A]nother forum that is 
increasingly popular with IP holders is the United States International Trade Commission 
(ITC).”). 
83 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (2012) (“The Commission shall conclude any such 
investigation and make its determination under this section at the earliest practicable time 
after the date of publication of notice of such investigation.”). 
84 See, e.g., Section 337 Investigations, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, 
USITC Pub. No. 4105, at 23 (Mar. 2009). 
85 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)–(e). 
86 See, e.g., TianRui Grp. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (affirming the ITC’s decision in Certain Cast Steel Railway Wheels, Processes 
for Manufacturing or Relating to Same and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-
655, USITC Pub. 4265 (Oct. 2011) (finding a violation of Section 337 and issuance of an 
exclusion order)); 78 Fed. Reg. 26653-54 (May 7, 2013) (Certain Electronic Fireplaces, 
Components Thereof, Manuals for Same, and Products Containing Same, Certain 
Processes for Manufacturing or Relating to Same, and Certain Products Containing 
Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-791/826 (consolidated), Limited Exclusion Order (May 1, 
2013)). 
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authority to change the law during its review.87  One benefit of this 
unique aspect of the ITC is that it allows parties to make additional 
arguments advocating against prior decisions.88  But it also comes 
with significant drawbacks, which are added layers of uncertainty 
and potential for business disruption.  As explained above, if the 
Commission departs from prior precedent but fails to provide 
adequate reasons for doing so, that may be legal error.  In practice, 
however, challenging the ITC’s decision and hoping for remand 
from the Federal Circuit may not be feasible.  For example, it may 
not make business sense for a party receiving an adverse ITC 
decision and an exclusion order that goes into effect sixty days 
after the ITC’s decision to wait for the Federal Circuit to hold the 
ITC accountable for departing from its prior precedent.  In the 
examples below, we describe specific instances where the ITC 
departed from prior precedent. 
1. To Satisfy the Technical Prong of the Domestic Industry 
Requirement, Complainant’s Products Can No Longer 
Practice an Invalid Claim 
Prior to 2012, patent validity was irrelevant to an analysis of 
the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement, which, 
along with the economic prong, comprise the domestic industry 
requirement.89  For example, in Certain Silicon Microphone 
Packages and Products Containing the Same, the Commission 
vacated the determination of the administrative law judge that the 
technical prong of domestic industry could not be met where the 
                                                                                                             
87 See, e.g., Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 312, 328 (Cust. 
Ct. 1980) (“The Tariff Commission [now the International Trade Commission], unlike 
American courts of law, is not bound by its own precedents.” (quoting James Pomeroy 
Hendrick, The United States Antidumping Act, 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 914, 924 (1964))). 
88 Id. (noting that plaintiffs “devoted an extensive portion of their memorandum” 
explaining why precedent did not apply to the instant case). 
89 See, e.g., InterDigital Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 707 F.3d 1295, 
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (describing the domestic industry requirement as having two 
prongs: “the ‘economic prong,’ which requires that there be an industry in the United 
States, and the ‘technical prong,’ which requires that the industry relate to articles 
protected by the patent”). 
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asserted claims were invalid.90  The ITC stated that its practice was 
to ignore the validity of a claim asserted only for domestic industry 
purposes, explaining that “[i]t is Commission practice not to 
couple an analysis of domestic industry to a validity analysis.”91  
The practical aspect of the rule was that if a Complainant chose to 
rely on an un-asserted claim for domestic industry—in other 
words, a claim not asserted as infringed by a respondent—it could 
avoid having to additionally defend validity of that claim. 
But in 2012, the Commission announced a different rule.  In 
Certain Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters and Products Containing 
Same, Inv. No 337-TA-739, the Commission held that the 
technical prong of domestic industry could be met only on a valid 
patent claim.  In particular, as the Commission explained its 
holding: “we have determined above that claim 1 of the ‘124 
patent and claim 1 of the ‘151 are invalid.  Thus, we determine that 
the only valid patent claim proven to be practiced by Leviton’s 
products is claim 1 of the ‘809 patent, and only Leviton’s Phase 7 
products practice that claim.”92  Because it is not bound by stare 
decisis, the Commission had the authority to change the law in 
such a way. 
In February 2013, the Commission confirmed this change, 
reversing an administrative law judge’s ruling of a violation of an 
asserted patent, because the Commission found the only claim of 
that patent practiced by the domestic industry products was 
invalid.93  As the Commission stated in its decision, “Litepanels 
only advanced arguments that the domestic industry products 
practice claim 17 of the ‘823 patent . . . .  [T]he Commission finds 
                                                                                                             
90 Certain Silicon Microphone Packages and Prods. Containing the Same, Notice of 
Commission Determination to Review in Part an Initial Determination; On Review 
Taking No Position on Two Issues and Vacating the Conclusion of No Domestic 
Industry; Termination of the Investigation With a Finding of No Violation, Inv. No. 337-
TA-695, USITC Pub. 4936-02, at 3 (Nov. 22, 2011) (Notice). 
91 Id. 
92 Certain Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 
337-TA-739, Comm’n Op. at 73–74 (June 8, 2012) (emphasis added), aff’d, Leviton Mfg. 
Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 528 F. App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming without 
opinion according to Rule 36). 
93 Certain LED Photographic Lighting Devices and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 
337-TA-804, Comm’n Op. at 17–18 (Feb. 28, 2013) (Final). 
722 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:703 
 
that claim 17 of the ‘823 patent is invalid.  Thus, with respect to 
the ‘823 patent, Litepanels has not proven that a valid patent claim 
is practiced by the domestic industry products.” 94 
2. Direct Infringement of a Method Claim by Testing in the 
United States Does Not Result in a Violation of Section 
337 
Patent owners routinely assert method claims at the ITC.  
Aside from contributory or induced infringement, a complainant in 
the past could prove a violation of section 337 by showing the 
respondent infringed a method claim through activities such as 
testing.95  Some companies conduct research, which may include 
testing, on their products in the United States after importing them.  
Under U.S. Patent law, if that testing resulted in the practicing of 
all steps of a method claim, it would constitute direct 
infringement.96 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit once affirmed the ITC’s finding of 
direct infringement of a method claim where infringement 
                                                                                                             
94 Id. (emphasis added). 
95 See, e.g., Certain Semiconductor Chips Having Synchronous Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Controllers and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-661, 
USITC Pub. 661, at 43 (Jan. 22, 2010) (Initial Determination) (finding direct 
infringement of method claims by respondents where the accused products met the 
limitations of the claims and the respondents tested the products in the U.S.) 
(infringement findings unreviewed by the Commission); Certain Digital Televisions and 
Certain Products Containing Same and Methods of Using Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-617, 
2009 WL 1124461, at *4 (Apr. 23, 2009) (“As to the Vizio and SBC respondents, we find 
that the joint stipulations [admitting that they conduct testing in the U.S.] JX-11C at ¶¶ 7-
9 an[d] ¶¶ 7-9 and JX-13C at ¶ 9 . . . [redaction] constitute substantial evidence to support 
the ALJ’s finding of direct infringement by these Respondents of [method] claim 23 of 
the ’074 patent.”); Certain GPS Devices and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-
TA-602, USITC Pub. No. 4137, at 10 (Jan. 27, 2009) (Final) (“The Commission finds 
that SiRF maintains control over the operation of the GPS receivers and thus directly 
infringes the ‘651 and ‘000 patents regardless of who is using the GPS receivers at the 
time the receivers perform the claimed ‘processing’ and ‘representing’ steps [of the 
method claim].”). 
96 See Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Infringement of a method claim ‘occurs when a party performs all of the steps of the 
process’ . . . .” (quoting BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007))). 
2014] THE ROLE OF STARE DECISIS AT THE ITC 723 
 
occurred when the respondent tested certain accused products.97  In 
Linear Technology Corporation v. U.S. International Trade 
Commission, the ITC found one of four devices made by 
Advanced Analogic Technologies, Inc. infringed a method claim 
for controlling a switching voltage regulator.98  On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the infringement finding for the first 
device and reversed the ITC’s decision that a second device did not 
infringe.99  For both devices, the Federal Circuit relied on evidence 
of testing in the United States to support finding direct 
infringement.  For the first device, the Federal Circuit stated: 
Contrary to AATI’s contentions, substantial 
evidence supports that it actually practiced the 
claimed method and, therefore, infringed claim 34.  
For example, there is testimony that AATI tested all 
of the accused products and generated voltage 
output graphs, as well as documentation and charts 
evidencing this testing.  As such, we affirm the 
Commission’s finding that the AAT1143 infringes 
claim 34.100 
The Federal Circuit also found Advanced Analogic’s testing of 
the second device in the U.S. supported direct infringement.  As 
the court reasoned, “[s]ubstantial evidence likewise supports 
finding that the method of claim 34 is practiced using the 
AAT1146 device.  That evidence consists of testimony of AATI 
testing, as well as voltage output graphs and documentation and 
charts evidencing this testing.”101 
In one of the ITC investigations involving testing, Certain GPS 
Devices and Products Containing Same, the ITC affirmatively 
stated that limited exclusion orders are appropriate regardless of 
the type of claim the respondent infringed.102  In particular, the 
                                                                                                             
97 See Linear Tech. Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
98 Id. at 1053–54. 
99 Id. at 1062–63. 
100 Id. at 1062. 
101 Id. at 1063. 
102 Certain GPS Devices and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-602, USITC 
Pub. No. 4137 (Jan. 27, 2009) (Final). 
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Commission explained, “[t]o the extent that Respondents suggest 
that a limited exclusion order is inappropriate for method claims, 
the Commission disagrees and views section 337 as equally 
applicable to articles that infringe method claims as well as 
apparatus claims.”103  In addition, it affirmatively stated that direct 
infringement of a method claim was enough to support a violation 
of section 337: “[t]he fact that certain software components or 
InstantFix services are required with SiRF’s chips for infringement 
to occur does not change the fact that a violation of section 337 
was found based on infringement of the asserted claims.  As 
correctly noted by Complainants, the accused chips include 
hardware and software that function integrally to cause 
infringement of these claims.”104 
Thus, under Commission precedent, importation coupled with 
practicing of the method through testing after importation 
supported a finding that a violation of section 337 occurred.  But 
that is no longer the case. 
In Certain Electronic Devices with Image Processing Systems, 
Components Thereof and Associated Software, the Commission set 
aside this precedent and held that the Complainant must prove 
infringement at the time of importation—not some time 
thereafter.105  In particular, the Commission held that the act of 
importation itself does not trigger infringement of a method claim: 
With respect to method claim 16 of the ‘146 patent, 
we find that Apple does not directly infringe the 
patented method when it imports the accused 
computers because the act of importation is not an 
act that practices the steps of the asserted method 
claim.  Precedents of the Federal Circuit draw a 
                                                                                                             
103 Id. at 16. 
104 Id. at 9–13, 16 (finding direct infringement of a method claim). 
105 Certain Elec. Devices with Image Processing Sys., Components Thereof, and 
Associated Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-724, USITC Pub. 4374, 2012 WL 3246515, at 
*15–20 (Dec. 21, 2011) (Final); see also Certain Gaming and Entertainment Consoles, 
Related Software, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752, 2013 WL 1367108, at 
*7 (Mar. 22, 2013) (Final) (“The Commission’s opinion in Electronic Devices [Inv. 337-
TA-724] holds that the practice of an asserted method claim within the United States after 
importation cannot serve as the basis for an exclusion order.”). 
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clear distinction between method and apparatus 
claims for purposes of infringement liability.  
Merely importing a device that may be used to 
perform a patented method does not constitute 
direct infringement of a claim to that method.106 
According to the Commission, contributory or induced 
infringement could still result in a violation, but a company’s 
performance of the claimed method steps through testing after 
importation will not.  Thus, while testing in the United States that 
performs all steps of an asserted method claim would constitute 
infringement in district court, it will not result in a violation of 
section 337 at the ITC.  As the Commission explained, “‘[u]se of a 
patented method may constitute infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a), but domestic use of such a method, without more, is not a 
sufficient basis for a violation of section 337(a)(1)(B)(i), which 
concerns the ‘importation’ or ‘sale’ of articles that infringe a U.S. 
patent.”107 
3. Satisfying the Domestic Industry Requirement Once but 
Not Twice 
Complainants who successfully satisfy the economic prong of 
the domestic industry requirement in a first ITC investigation 
might return to the ITC expecting the Commission to reach the 
same conclusion on that issue.  Unfortunately, that is not always 
the case. 
For example, then Chief ALJ Paul J. Luckern granted Freescale 
Semiconductor, Inc.’s motion for summary determination that it 
satisfied the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement 
in Certain Integrated Circuits, Chipsets, and Prods. Containing 
Same Including Televisions, Media Players, and Cameras.108  The 
                                                                                                             
106 Certain Elec. Devices with Image Processing Sys., Components Thereof, and 
Associated Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-724, USITC Pub. 4374, 2012 WL 3246515, at 
*17 (Dec. 21, 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
107 Id. at *19. 
108 Certain Integrated Circuits, Chipsets, and Prods. Containing Same Including 
Televisions, Media Players, and Cameras, Inv. No. 337-TA-709, Order No. 33 (Jan. 5, 
2011). 
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ALJ found that Freescale received substantial revenue from 
licensing its patent portfolio, which included the asserted patent, 
and that it made a substantial investment in its licensing activities 
through a certain number of employees dedicated to licensing 
Freescale’s patents.109  The Commission declined to review this 
decision, effectively agreeing with the ALJ’s conclusion. 
On June 8, 2011, Freescale filed a second complaint at the ITC 
asserting that the respondents infringed the same patent it asserted 
in Invoice 709.110  Unlike Invoice 709, ALJ Rogers presided over 
the second investigation initiated by Freescale, Invoice Number 
337-TA-786.  In contrast to ALJ Luckern’s holding in the first 
Investigation, ALJ Rogers denied Freescale’s motion for summary 
determination that it satisfied the economic prong of the domestic 
industry requirement.111  After the evidentiary hearing, he found 
Freescale did not satisfy the economic prong in his Final Initial 
Determination.112  The Commission agreed, finding that Freescale 
failed to prove its licensing activities satisfied the economic 
prong.113  Thus, Freescale had a domestic industry in Inv. 709 but 
not in Inv. 786, based on the same patent. 
Why the change?  In August 2011, after the Commission 
adopted the ALJ’s conclusion that Freescale satisfied the economic 
prong in Inv. 709, the ITC issued its decision in Certain 
Multimedia Display and Navigation Devices and Systems, 
Components Thereof and Products Containing Same.114  In that 
decision, the Commission set forth new requirements that a 
                                                                                                             
109 Id. at 7–8. 
110 See Eric W. Schweibenz, Freescale Files New 337 Complaint Regarding Certain 
Integrated Circuits, OBLON, http://www.oblon.com/freescale-files-new-337-complaint-
regarding-certain-integrated-circuits-0 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
111 See Certain Integrated Circuits, Chipsets, and Prods. Containing Same Including 
Televisions, Inv. No. 337-TA-786, USITC Order No. 19 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
112 See Certain Integrated Circuits, Chipsets, and Prods. Containing Same Including 
Televisions, Inv. No. 337-TA-786, USITC Pub. 4406, at 163 (July 12, 2012) 
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113 See Certain Integrated Circuits, Chipsets, and Prods. Containing Same Including 
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complainant must satisfy in order to meet the economic prong 
through its portfolio licensing activities.  Specifically, in order to 
be considered “exploitation” through licensing within the meaning 
of the statute, the activities asserted by a complainant must relate 
to the patent asserted in the investigation, relate to licensing, and 
take place in the United States.115 
If the complainant’s activities satisfy all three of these 
requirements, it must also satisfy two additional requirements.  
First, it must establish how much of its licensing activities are 
attributable to the asserted patent.116  When a company’s licenses 
involve its entire patent portfolio, the Commission considers the 
relative importance of the asserted patent to the licensing 
investment in the portfolio to determine the extent to which the 
investment can be attributed to the asserted patent.117  In other 
words, the Commission considers the strength of the nexus 
between the licensing investment and the asserted patent.118  
Second, these licensing activities must be “substantial.”119  In 
Navigation Devices, the Commission outlined evidence that would 
support a complainants’ argument that it satisfied the economic 
prong, such as: 
(1) The existence of other types of “exploitation” 
[activities] . . .; 
 (2) The existence of license-related “ancillary” 
activities . . .; 
 (3) Whether complainant’s licensing activities are 
continuing; and 
(4) Whether complainant’s licensing activities are 
the type of activities that are referenced favorably in 
the legislative history of section 337(a)(3)(C).120 
Thus, the Commission examined whether Freescale satisfied 
the domestic industry requirement in the second investigation 
                                                                                                             
115 Id. at 7–8. 
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using its new economic prong analysis set forth in Navigation 
Devices.  Freescale’s ability to satisfy the economic prong turned 
on whether it could apportion its licensing activities to the asserted 
patent.  Using this test, the Commission found Freescale’s 
evidence relating to the asserted patent lacking, explaining that 
“the evidence presented by Freescale here does not allow the 
Commission to ascertain how the ‘455 patent relates to its overall 
licensing program.”121  Indeed, the Commission found Freescale 
did not even identify which of its portfolio licenses included the 
asserted patent.  The Commission continued, concluding that 
“Freescale has failed to present sufficient evidence to allow us to 
determine what portion of its investment we should consider, and 
thus, to determine whether its investment is ‘substantial,’ as 
required by section 337(a)(3)(C).”122  In sum, Freescale’s lack of 
detailed evidence relating the asserted patent to its licensing 
activities ultimately sank its domestic industry argument. 
CONCLUSION 
All litigation forums have their own unique risks and 
advantages.  The ITC offers great speed and a strong remedy, but 
because the doctrine of stare decisis does not bind the Commission 
to its own precedent, litigation there presents unique challenges 
and opportunities.  In the ITC examples described above, the ALJ 
made a decision based on ITC precedent that the Commission then 
reversed.  Such changes present a challenge to the parties as they 
cannot predict when the Commission will make such a change.  
That same risk also presents opportunities to advocate for changes 
favorable to a party’s positions. 
                                                                                                             
121 Certain Integrated Circuits, Chipsets, and Prods. Containing Same Including 
Televisions, Inv. No. 337-TA-786, USITC Pub. 4406, at 29 (Oct. 10, 2012) (Final). 
122 Id. at 30. 
